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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiffs-Appellants, William and Marie Averett (Averetts
hereinafter) appeal from an adverse judgment of the Fourth
Judicial District Court of Utah County, The Honorable George E.
Ballif, District Judge, dismissed the Averett's Complaint for
adverse possession, no cause of action, quieted title in and to
approximately two acres of farmland we^t of Springville, Utah
County in the defendant-respondent Utah County Drainage District,
(Drainage District hereinafter)

No. 1, and awarded the Drainage

District all funds tendered to the Court by the Intervenor,
Intermountain Power Agency (IPA hereinafter).
On or about April 30, 1968, Averetts purchased property from
Joseph C. and Naida R. Williamson receiving a Warranty Deed
naming Marie Averett as sole grantee (R. ,300-307).

Averetts did

not see or receive a copy of the deed until this cause of action
arose (R. 306-446).

The Warranty Deed 4 e s c r i b e d
1

a

rectangular

parcel 01 rarmiana wesu or ^pringville, Utah County, Utah,
consisting of approximately 20 acres and enclosed by a fence (R.
306-307).

The Warranty Deed excluded:

that portion of the above-described property sold to
Utah County Drainage District No. 1, a corporation,
by Warranty Deed dated July 31, 1934, executed by
Chillian F. Packard and Phoebee S. Packard, his wife,
recorded April 3, 1935, as Entry No. 3091, in Book
316, Page 50, records of Utah County, Utah. (R. 214).
Shortly after Averetts purchased the land, they sold the west
half (R. 310) and retained the east 10.19 acres (R. 337, 346).
The property subject to this dispute is the area within the
Averetts remaining 10.19 acres which was deeded by Chillian F.
Packard to the Drainage District and excluded

on the deed

conveying the Williamsons' interest in the property to the
Averetts.

The disputed area is a 66 foot wide strip of land

running from the southeast corner, within and adjacent .to the
east boundary

and

fence

line of the Averett

property

to

approximately 15 feet south of the northern border of the Averett
property.

From there the 66 foot wide strip runs west almost

parallel with the northern boundary and fence line of the Averett
property until the strip continues past the west boundary and
fence line of the Averett property. (See defendant's Exhibit No.
11).

The disputed property consists of approximately two acres

(R. 374).
The Averetts and the Drainage District discovered

the

Drainage District's interest in the disputed strip when the IPA
offered to purchase the entire 10.19 acres.

The IPA, Averetts

and the Drainage District stipulated to a price of $30,000.00 for
2

the disputed parcel, such parcel being subject to tne rinai
disposition of this case.

The IPA tendered the funds to the

District Court and judgment was entered condemning the property
in fee for the use and benefit of the IPA |(R. 245-246).

The IPA

has subsequently constructed and is currently operating a coal
rail car maintenance facility on the property.
A drainage ditch, which was constructed in 1919 or 1920, (R.
453-457, 473-474) was in place along the eastern strip of the
disputed property.

The ditch then turns west and runs between

the Averetts1 northern boundary and fence line and the northern
strip of the disputed property.

(See defendant's Exhibit No.

11).
The average width of the channel of water in the ditch is
normally four to five feet unless the channel is blocked.

Then

it expands to approximately eight feet (iR. 481-485, 494, 503).
From the edge of the bank of the ditch to the water surface level
measures approximately eight to ten feet (R. 372-373).
After purchasing the land in 1968, the existing fences
surrounding the 10.19 acres, including the disputed property,
were maintained by William Averett or neighboring property owners
(R. 322-324).

Those fences allowed Averetts to maintain a feed

lot with up to 200 head of cattle on the property at various
times of the year (R. 324-328, 447, 479, 531, 534). Although the
adequacy of the fences from 1968 until this dispute arose is
disputed by the Drainage District, (R. 491|-492, 528-529, 533) the
fence line was recognized as the outside perimeter of the Averett
3

property (R. 308, 322-324, 479-480, 512, 528-529, 533).
Inside the fence and partially on the disputed parcel,
Averetts built a corral, loading chute, and shed (R. 315-317,
466, 479).

Averetts also built a corn silage pit partially on

the disputed parcel and excavated through the banks of the ditch
in order to drain water out of the pit and into the
317-320, 466, 479).

ditch (R.

The exact size of the silage pit is

disputed but evidence ranged from 100 feet by 40 feet (R. 321) to
25 feet by 50 feet (R. 532, 495).

The Averetts never received

any notice from the Drainage District or anyone else that they
had invaded Drainage District property by building a corral,
loading chute, shed and silage pit (R. 328).

This is true even

though Drainage District personnel saw the construction in the
ditch and on the disputed parcel (R. 447, 459, 461, 479, 495).
The Averetts otherwise indicated their ownership claim in
the disputed property by placing "NO TRESPASSING" and

"NO

HUNTING" signs on the gate and fences surrounding the property
(R. 336).

The Averetts also excluded

trespassers when the

occasion required (R. 336).
The Utah County Tax Assessment was based on the entire 10.19
acres, including the disputed property each year from 1968 until
this dispute arose (R. 337-342, 449-450).
dispute arose, the Drainage District

Also, until this

assessed

its tax as

authorized under Title 19 of the Utah Code Annotated at the rate
of 50 cents per acre on the entire 10.19 acres, including the
disputed property in which the Drainage District held fee title
4

(R. 418-425, 433-434).

The Averetts always paid the taxes as

assessed either by Utah County or the Drainage District (R. 345,
448).
The Drainage District was organized on November 4, 1918 as a
Municipal Corporation under the predecesslor to Title 19, Utah
Code Annotated (R. 213). In 1919 or 1920, the Drainage District
constructed the open drains including the irain on the disputed
property from Utah Lake eastward into tljie fields (R. 454-455,
470-472).

The Drainage District has a r^ght of entry on lands

for Drainage District purposes under Utah Code Annotated, Section
19-4-4.

The Drainage District constructed the ditch on the

disputed property under this statutory right of entry (R. 455)
and continued to use and maintain the ditch under that right of
entry until the disputed parcel was deeded to the Drainage
District in 1934 by Chillian F. Packard and Phoebe S. Packard.
(See defendant's Exhibit No. 17). Arthur C. Boyer was president
of the Drainage District for approximately 30 years ending in
1982 (R. 470) and was predecessor to Raph^l Palfreyman (R. 452).
During Mr. Boyerfs presidency, he understood

that the

Drainage District had only an easement across the disputed
property (R. 474-477, 495-496) and believe^ that all entry on the
disputed land by Drainage District personnel was permissive (R.
475-477).

Whenever Mr. Boyer entered the Averetts1 property, he

entered through a gate maintained by William Averett (R. 479).
Mr. Boyer was unaware of any fee interest 'in land held by the
5

Drainage District until after the dispute arose (R. 479-480, 482,
495-496).
Mr. Palfreyman worked as a maintenance man for the Drainage
District for four to five years prior to the time he became
president (R. 451-452).

As president and an employee of the

Drainage District, Mr. Palfreyman understood and believed that
his entry on the disputed property was under right of an easement
(R. 460, 463, 467, 546-547) and was unaware of the Drainage
Districts fee interest in the property until this dispute arose
(R. 461, 530-531).

Mr. Craig Giles Crandall, secretary of the

district at the time of trial and Mrs. Jesse Packard Condee, Mr.
Gilesf

predecessor as secretary, were both unaware

of the

District f s ownership of any real property until after this
dispute arose (R. 429-430, 435).
Generally, the only method of maintaining the ditch was by
walking along the ditch bottom with a shovel to remove debris (R.
458-459, 4 7 7 ) .

The Drainage District has not used heavy

equipment to clean or maintain the ditch since its construction
in 1919 or 1920 (R. 458). Only once or twice has a jeep or pickup truck been taken on the disputed property with a load of rocks
to be used to maintain the ditch (R. 481, 485).
Statements by Mr. Palfreyman as president of the Drainage
District were that the Drainage District had no specific plans
for the property owned (R. 461, 546).
searched

title and surveyed

It was only after the IPA

the property that the Drainage

District became aware of its interest in the disputed property
6

(R. 430, 435, 460, 490).

It was at this same time that the

Averetts became aware that they did not own the interest in the
disputed property (R. 188, 345).

As part

>f the agreement with

the Drainage District, the IPA agreed in its "Stipulation of
Immediate Occupancy" to:
provide in its construction on the property for the
irrigation and drainage facilities th^it presently
exist on the property pursuant to the requirements
and permits of Springville City.
5. Petitioner and Intervenor shall not during the
course of modification or alteration of the irrigation
and drainage facilities or during the course of
construction of its other facilities, unduly or
unreasonably interfere with the irrigation and drainage
facilities and rights of defendant...
7. Defendant Utah County Drainage District No. 1,
reserves to itself, and petitioner in intervention
grant to defendant, Utah County Drainage District No.
1 , an easement for purposes of maintenance of its
drainage facilities. The location ^nd description of
said easement shall be as agreed by said parties
(R. 64).
IPA has completed construction of £ pipeline rerouting a
portion of the ditch, granted an easerient to the

Drainage

District in the area where the ditch runs and will maintain the
ditch across its property (R. 462-463, 547).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Averetts adversely possessed the approximately two acre
disputed property based on their belief of ownership and not
based on a written instrument.

Therefore Section 78-12-10, Utah

Code Annotated applied.
The Averetts purchased the farmland in 1968 unaware of the
exclusion of the disputed parcel.

From 1968 until 1983 they

believed and acted as if the land were theirs.
7

Both the Averetts

and Drainage District Personnel believed that the District
maintained the drainage ditch across the Averett

property

pursuant to a statutory or prescriptive easement.

Drainage

District personnel were unaware of the District's fee interest in
the property until the IPA agreed to purchase the land from the
Averetts.
Under Section 78-12-10, Utah Code Annotated, the Averetts
adversely possessed the land by continued occupation of the land
under a claim of title.

They excluded all others by placing "NO

TRESPASSING11 and "NO HUNTING" signs on the perimeter fences.
Drainage District personnel always entered through the gates and
did so on the mutual belief of a statutory right of entry granted
in Utah Code Annotated 19-4-4 or the existence of an easement.
In Kouri v. Burnette, 416 P.2d 963 (Ok. 1966), Burnette
adversely possessed land of a third party despite the private
easement of ingress and egress Kouri had acquired.

KouriTs use

of the easement did not disturb Burnetts' exclusive possession of
the property.

In Stark v. Stanhope, 206 Kan. 428, 480 P.2d 72

(1971), Stark adversely possessed land held by a municipal
corporation cemetery district subject to the Cemetery District's
easement of ingress and egress to other cemetery property.

The

Court held that the use by Stark of the land for farming purposes
was similar to other uses of land in the area and that the
cemetery's use of the roadway for access to its other property
did not interrupt the exclusive possession of the property by
Stark.
8

The Averetts* use of the disputed property was similar to
that of other property in the area while the Drainage District's
use was believed to be an easement and is dissimilar to other
properties in the area.

Therefore, the Averetts* possession of

the disputed property was exclusive and cohtinuous as required in
Section 78-12-10.
The Averetts also maintained the fences surrounding the
property at the time of purchase and kept up to 175 or 200 head
of cattle on the property at various tidies of the year.

This

satisfies the substantial inclosure requirement of Section 78-1211(1), Utah Code Annotated.
The Averetts built a corral, loading chute, sheds and corn
silage pit next to the ditch near the southwest corner of the
acreage and partially on the disputed property.

The IPA paid the

Averetts $27,000 for these improvemehts .

Therefore, the

improvement

requirement

of Section

78-12-11(2) was also

satisfied.
Section 78-12-12 requires that alll taxes assessed on the
property be paid before adverse possession is found.

In Utah

Copper Company v. Chandler, 45 UT 85, 1^2 P. 1119 (1914), this
Court held that if no taxes were lawfully assessed, then taxes
need not be paid to adversely possess the property.

In the

instant case, the fee was held by the Drainage District which is
generally not taxed on its property.

However, Utah County taxed

the Averetts for the two acres of the disputed property.

Also

the Drainage District itself taxed the Averetts on the two acres
9

in dispute.
manner.

The Averetts paid all taxes assessed in a timely

If these taxes were not lawfully assessed, the Averetts

did not need to pay those taxes under Utah Copper Company to
comply with Section 78-12-12, Utah Code Annotated.
taxes were properly

If those

assessed, then the Averetts paid the

assessments thereby fulfilling the requirements of that section.
Because the Averetts continuously occupied the property
under a claim of ownership

for the requisite

time

period

excluding all others, inclosed the property with a substantial
inclosure, improved the property and paid all taxes assessed,
they have adversely possessed the property.
The Drainage District did not hold the property for public
purposes and therefore the Averetts1 adverse possession is not
barred by Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-13*
In Pioneer

Investment

and Trust Company

v. Board of

Education of Salt Lake City, 35 UT 1, 99 P. 150 (1909), this
Court held

that property on which the public use has been

terminated, and the property held for sale is not held for a
public use and can be adversely possessed.
The Drainage District in this case was unaware of its fee
interest in the property for over 30 years just prior to this
action.

All its entries on the disputed property were based on a

belief of an easement or statutory right of entry.

The District

president admitted that it had no plans for the land; that it was
not necessary

for the District to own land; and that the

ownership of this land was not critical to the operation of the
10

District.

The IPA has granted an easement to the District;

constructed a pipeline for the water across the property; and
agreed to maintain the ditch across the property.

Therefore, the

property is not necessary or held for & public use and the
Averetts adverse possession is valid.
If it is determined

that the ditch itself is a public

purpose, then portions of the disputed property held by the
District beyond

that occupied by the ditch and used for access

and maintenance

is unnecessary

District's public purpose.

for accomplishment of the

That excess is subject to adverse

possession by the Averetts.
Defendant's Exhibit No. 11 shows that the ditch is less than
half the width of the disputed property and that along the north
end of the property, the ditch is almost entirely on the
Averetts1

property

rather

than on th^ disputed

property.

Therefore, the excess property can be adversely possessed by the
Averetts and title should be quieted in them to such property.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THE AVERETTS HAD
NOT ESTABLISHED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THEIR
CLAIM TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY ADVERSE POSSESSION.
The Averetts claim of ownership of the disputed property is
based on adverse possession of the property for the requisite
period

under

instrument.

a claim

of right

rather

than on a written

Therefore, their adverse possession of the property

is determined under Sections 78-12-10, 78-12-11 and 78-12-12 of
11

the Utah Code Annotated.
A.

The Averetts Have Claimed Ownership and Occupied the
Land Exclusive of Any Other Right.

Section 78-12-10 of the Utah Code Annotated states:
Where it appears that there has been an actual,
continued occupation of land under a claim of title,
exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon a
written instrument, judgment or decree, the land so
actually occupied, and no other, is deemed to be held
adversely.
It was undisputed at trial that the Averetts occupied the entire
10.19 acre area within their fences, including the disputed
property as owners of such property from the time of their
purchase in 1968 through 1983 when this dispute arose (R. 307,
310, 312-313, 325, 336-337, 342-346, 447, 458-459).

During the

period of their possession, the Averetts held the disputed
property "exclusive of any other right" even though the Drainage
District had statutory right to enter the property to maintain
the ditch under Utah Code Annotated, Section 19-4-4.

In Kouri v.

Burnett, 415 P.2d 963 (Ok. 1966), Burnett adversely possessed
land held by third parties even though Kouri had an easement of
ingress and egress to his own property.

The Court said:

The circumstances that the defendant had a private
easement over the strip did not weaken the exclusive
character of plaintiff's possession to the extent that
plaintiff would be precluded from acquiring
prescriptive title to the strip of land. Id. at 968.
In Stark v. Stanhope, 206 Kan. 428, 480 P.2d 72 (1971),
Stark adversely possessed land held by a cemetery district, which
was a municipal corporation under Kansas law, even though the
cemetery district used a road across the disputed parcel for
12

access to the cemetery.

In that case the j Court held that since

the Starks1 use of the land was the ordinary use to which other
land

similarly

situated was used, the ! cemetery use of the

property as a roadway was not sufficient tb break the continuity
of the Starks? exclusive possession and u&e of the remainder of
the tract.

Therefore the Court quieted titile in Stark subject to

the cemetery district's easement in the property.
In the instant case, the Averetts us^d the land as a feed
lot which is similar to farming purposes irj the area (R. 324-328,
447, 479, 531, 534).

The Drainage Distrijct on the other hand,

used the property in the form of an easement for its drainage
ditch.

Although there are other ditches in the vicinity which

are maintained by the Drainage District (R.j 212-213), the primary
use of the land around the area is for farjming and therefore the
Drainage District's use of the land under its right of entry
authorized by Section 19-4-4 of the Utah Cdde did not disturb the
Averetts 1

exclusive and continuous possession of the land.

Therefore, this Court, upon finding the otlier elements of adverse
possession are satisfied, should quiet ititle to the subject
property in the Averetts subject to the easement rights of the
Utah County Drainage District.
B. The Averetts Protected the Land By a Substantial
Inclosure and Improved the Land.
Section 78-12-11 of the Utah Code Annotated states:
For the purpose of continuing and adverse possession by
a person claiming title, not founded upon a written
instrument, judgment, or decree, landjis deemed to have
been possessed and occupied in the| following cases
only:
13

(1) Where it has been protected by a substantial
Inclosure;
(2) Where it has been usually cultivated or
improved;
(3) Where labor or money has been expended upon
dams, canals, embankments, aqueducts or otherwise for
the purpose of irrigating such lands amounting to the
sum of $5.00 per acre.
Plaintiffs concede that they have not satisfied the third
requirement of expending labor or money on dams, etc. and that
the trial courtfs Finding of Fact No. 17 concerning that factor
of adverse possession is correct.

However, the statute is

disjunctive and only one of the three requirements need be
satisfied to establish title by adverse possession.

Central

Pacific Railway Company v. Tarpey, 51 Ut. 107, 168 P. 554 (1917).
1.

The Averetts Protected the Property With a Substantial
Inclosure

With respect to the first requirement that the property be
protected by a substantial Inclosure, the trial courtfs Findings
of Facts Nos. 20 through 23 are clearly erroneous.

William

Averett testified at trial that the entire property was fenced
when he purchased it (R. 303-304, 357-358) and he fully believed
that he was purchasing the property within the four fences (R.
307, 360). He testified that when he purchased the property the
existing fence on the east side of the property, had been built
by the railroad (R. 307-308).

The fence on the north side of the

property was in "less than desirable condition" so he constructed
a new fence along the old fence line (R. 308). Shortly after the
Averetts purchased the property, they sold the west ten acres to
his neighbor on the south (R. 310) and together they
14

built a new

fence to separate the properties (R. 312-313).
and the fence on the south was always kept in

That new fence

Tf

A-1 condition" by

his neighbor (R. 313). Mr. Averett testified that he maintained
the fences in order to keep his cattle in (R. 322-323) or that
his neighbor to the south and west maintained the south and west
fences (R. 323).
Although

there is some discrepancy regarding how well

maintained the fences were, (R. 359, 491-492, 524-527, 533) it
was still recognized that the property within the four fences was
the Averetts1 property

(R. 479-480, 495, 528-529, 533-534).

Furthermore, from 1968 to 1983, William Averett maintained a
cattle feed lot on the entire 10.19 acres within the fences (R.
324, 447, 478-479, 534) and had 175 to 200 cattle on the property
at various times of the year (R. 325-328, 531).

To further

protect his property, William Averett put either "NO TRESPASSING"
or "HUNTING BY PERMISSION" signs on the perimeter fences (R.
336).
The fences described

above constitute

a substantial

inclosure satisfying Section 78-12-11(1) of the Utah Code and
therefore the trial courtfs Findings of Fact Nos. 20-23 are
erroneous and should be reversed.
2.

The Averetts Improved the Disputed Property

The trial court properly found that the Averetts did not
usually cultivate the disputed property as stated in Paragraph 18
of its Findings of Fact.

However

the Court's

finding in

Paragraph 19 that the Averetts failed to establish by a
15

preponderance of the evidence the size of the silage pit and the
extent to which it existed on the disputed property is clearly
erroneous.

William AverettTs testimony indicated that he built a

corral, loading chute and shed (R. 315) on the property next to
the ditch

in the southeast corner of the Averett property

partially on the disputed land (R. 315-317).

The corral was

constructed out of pine poles and was approximately 40 feet by
100 feet (R. 319).

In 1973, Averetts built a silage pit on the

edge of the ditch as it ran along the east boundary of the
Averett property at a cost of $3,700.00 (R. 317-318).
was four to six feet deep (R. 321).

The pit

Although testimony varies,

the silage pit was at least 20 feet by 50 feet (R. 321, 495, 532,
543).

The silage pit drained its excess water into the ditch (R.

321) and during construction, the bank of the ditch was excavated
to install a drain pipe from the silage pit (R. 466, 495). When
IPA negotiated

the price of the land and improvements with

William Averett, they agreed to purchase the land for $15,000.00
an acre, the silage pit for $25,000.00 and the corral, loading
chute and sheds for $2,000.00 (R. 344-348).
These improvements valued at nearly as much as the two acres
of disputed property were constructed next to the ditch and
partially on the disputed property.

Therefore, they satisfy the

improvement requirement of Section 78-12-11(2) and the trial
courtfs Findings of Fact No. 19 is clearly erroneous.
C. The Averetts Paid All Taxes Assessed By Utah County and
The Drainage District on the Disputed Property Whether Or Not
Those Assessments Were Lawful.
16

Section 78-12-12 of the Utah Code Annotated states:
In no case shall adverse possession be considered
established under the provisions of any Section of this
Code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been
occupied and claimed for a period of seven years
continuously, and that the party, his predecessors and
grantors have paid all taxes which have been levied and
assessed upon such land according to law.
The trial courtf.s Findings of Fact NosL 14 and 15 state:
14. Utah County has not levied or assessed any real
property taxes against the real property of defendant.
15. Plaintiffs have paid all the taxes which were
levied and assessed against their property which
adjoins the subject property. Said tax assessments
included the subject property of the defendant.
i

From those Findings it can be said that the county has not
assessed taxes to the Drainage District for any of its property,
but Utah County has assessed

taxes to

he Averetts for the

disputed property in which record titlel was in the Drainage
District (R. 338). The Averetts have paid all taxes assessed to
them by Utah County on the disputed property (R. 337-339, 341342, 449).

In addition, the Drainage District itself assessed

taxes of 50 cents an acre on the entir^^ 10.19 acres of the
Averetts' property including the disputed property, these taxes
also were timely paid by the Averetts (R. ^38, 419-426).
In Utah Copper Company v. Chandler, ^5 Ut. 85, 142 P. 1119
(1914), this Court held that an adverse possessor must pay all
taxes lawfully levied and assessed against^ the premises claimed
to obtain title therein.
If, however, no taxes were lawfully assessed or
levied against the premises so claimecj and occupied
by them, they could acquire title by Adverse possession without payment of taxes. Id. at 11120.
17

In the case at hand, the Averetts paid taxes on the disputed
property levied by Utah County and the Drainage District even
though those taxes were assessed unlawfully.

Therefore, under

Utah Copper Company, the Averetts were not required to pay taxes
unlawfully assessed.

Their payment of those unlawful taxes more

than satisfies the requirements of Section 78-12-12.

POINT II
THE AVERETTS CAN ADVERSELY POSSESS THE DISPUTED PROPERTY
WHICH WAS NOT HELD BY THE DRAINAGE DISTRICT FOR PUBLIC USE.
Section 78-12-13 states:
No person shall be allowed any right or title in or to
any land held by any town, city or county or the
corporate authorities thereof, designated for public
use ... or for any other public purpose, by adverse
possession thereof for any length of time whatsoever...
That section of the Utah Code Annotated prevents running of the
statute of limitations for property held for public purposes by a
municipal corporation.

However, in Pioneer Investment and Trust

Company v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City, 35 Ut. 1, 99 P.
150 (1909), this Court held that a similar predecessor statute
applied "only to property which is devoted to a special public
use."

Id. at 153*

In that case, the school board ceased using

the disputed property for school purposes and held it for sale
for ten to fifteen years prior to the actions giving rise to the
case.

The Court determined that the statute was not applicable

because the property was not held for public purpose.
In Sisson v. Koelle, 10 Wash. App. 746, 520 P. 2d 1380
(1974), the trial court found that Clallam County, the Sissons
18

predecessor in interest, "had abandoned ahd forgotten about and
had done nothing to sustain any title, or Ownership or control of
the land in questions.ff

Id. at 1383.

Thej Court of Appeals held

that Koelle had adversely possessed thd property against the
county when the county never devoted, reserved or set apart the
property for use as a public right of way 0r for any other public
purpose.
In the case at hand, the Drainage District president, Mr.
Boyer, who was president for 30 years up until 1982, was unaware
that the Drainage District owned any property anywhere until he
heard of the IPA desire to purchase the property (R. 482, 490,
496).

During his years as president, Mr. Boyer always believed

the Drainage District had an easement to access the ditch for
maintenance purposes (R. 496). Mr. Palfre|yman, president of the
Drainage District from 1982 until trial (Rj. 451) and maintenance
person for the Drainage District for four to five years prior to
that time, (R. 452) was unaware of the f§e interest until IPA
notified him of its desire to purchase the disputed property (R.
460, 463-464, 466). Mr. Palfreyman always believed that he had a
right or easement to enter the property tR. 452, 455, 460-462,
467). In addition, the last two secretaries of the Drainage
District were also unaware of its fee interest in the property
until after this dispute arose (R. 429-430^ -34-435).
The Drainage District was organized in 1918 under the
predecessor of Title 19 of the Utah C^lde Annotated.

Under

Section 19-4-4 of the Utah Code Annotated, Drainage District
19

personnel:
may go upon said lands with their servants, teams,
tools, instruments, or other equipment, for the
purpose of constructing [the drains], and may
forever thereafter enter upon said lands, as
aforesaid, for the purpose of maintaining or
repairing such proposed works.
It is undisputed that the drain was built and constructed in
1919 or 1920 (R. 453-457, 473-474).

From that date until 1934

when the Packards deeded the disputed property to the Drainage
District, the District did not own the ditch as stated

in

Paragraph 11 of the trial courts Findings of Fact (R. 215).
During that time the Drainage District had a statutory right of
entry to construct and maintain the ditch across the land.
Testimony indicated that it was never necessary for the Drainage
District to own the land to accomplish its purpose either before
or after the deed to the District had been granted (R. 452, 455,
461, 475-477).

Statements by Mr. Palfreyraan indicated that the

Drainage District didnft need to own land (R. 464-465).

Also,

Mr. Palfreyman indicated that the disputed property was not
necessary or critical to the operation of the Drainage District
(R. 546-547) and that the District had no plans for the property
(R. 461).
In its negotiation with the parties, IPA agreed to grant an
easement to the Drainage District across the acquired property
(R. 63-65, 462-464, 523-524).
In summary, the Drainage District operated for fourteen
years from 1920 to 1934 under a statutory right of entry.
1934, the District obtained fee title to the disputed property
20

In

but for at least 30 years prior to this action, Drainage District
personnel were unaware that it owned the property.
on the disputed

property

All entries

during that time were under the

statutory right of entry or a belief of the existence of an
easement.

The Drainage District remained unaware of its fee

interest in the disputed property until the IPA attempted to
purchase it.

At that time the IPA agrfeed to pay either the

Averetts or the Drainage District for the property as determined
in this action, also the IPA granted an easement for the
continued use of the property.

From thede circumstances, the

trial court should have determined that th^ Drainage District did
not hold the property for public purpose;! that the plaintiffs
adversely possessed the disputed property] and that Section 7812-13 is not applicable in this case.
Alternatively, if the property whdre the ditch runs is
determined to be held for a public purposq, the subject property
exceeds that amount of property reasonably necessary for Drainage
District purposes and the excess is not h^ld for public purpose.
The water in the ditch ranges from fbur to eight feet wide
(R. 330, 481-485, 494, 503).

Expert testimony presented by the

Drainage District indicated that the afea that the ditch and
banks occupied as it ran through the 10.19 acres of the Averettsf
property was approximately one acre (RL 374-375).

However,

defendant's Exhibit No. 11 shows that the ditch and banks only
lie on the subject property as the ditch ifuns from the southeast
to the northeast corner of the 10.19 acre|s.
21

From the northeast

corner to the northwest corner of the property, the ditch lies
almost entirely on property to which the fee is held by the
Averetts.

The disputed strip of land is just south of the ditch

as it runs across that end of the property

(See defendant's

Exhibit No. 11).
Also,

since

the

ditch

on the subject

property

was

constructed, the ditch has been maintained generally by Drainage
District personnel as they walk in the ditch to remove blockages
and to dig out problem areas (R. 458-459, 488-489, 519-520).
Drainage District personnel have used a pick-up or jeep to haul
rocks in to the ditch but only on one or two occasions (R. 481482, 486-487).

Not since the ditch was constructed has the

Drainage District used heavy equipment to maintain the ditch (R.
458-459, 529-530).
The

width

of the ditch

and

land

necessary

for

its

maintenance is much less than the 66 foot strip on which the
ditch runs along on the east side of the Averett property along
the northern side of the property, the ditch is almost entirely
on the Averett

property

rather

than the disputed parcel.

Therefore, the excess land not necessary for maintaining the
ditch along the east and the entire strip along the north should
be quieted in the Averetts.

Therefore, this Court should remand

the case to establish the extent of the land occupied by the
ditch and that reasonably necessary for maintenance thereof.
Title should then be quieted in the Drainage District to that
portion of the eastern strip of the disputed property as
22

reasonably

necessary

for Drainage District purposes.

The

remaining portion of the disputed property should be quieted in
the Averetts.
CONCLUSION
The Averetts purchased property enclbsed by a fence less
approximately two acres deeded in 193^ to the Drainage District
which is the subject of this dispute.
they owned
property.

the entire

however, they believed

10.19 acres including the disputed

For 15 years they treated the property as theirs by

posting "NO TRESPASSING" and "NO HUNTING" signs on the perimeter
fences.

They allowed the Drainage District personnel to enter

under a mutual belief of an easement or ri^ht of entry.
The perimeter fences were maintained and contained from 175
to 200 head of cattle.

The Averetts also placed improvements on

the property and paid all taxes assessed t>y Utah County and the
Drainage District itself whether or nd>t lawfully assessed.
Therefore, the Averetts have adversely possessed the disputed
property.
The Drainage District personnel were Unaware of its interest
in the property for over 30 years prior i to this action.

The

Districts president's belief was that, the property was not
critical to the operation of the District and all prior entry on
the land was under a statutory right Of entry or easement.
Therefore, the property is not held for public use and may be
adversely possessed.

Therefore, title tlb the property, all or

the portion which is found to be unnecessa rv to the public
23

purpose of the District, should be quieted in the Averetts.

(j>

Respectfully submitted this

day of

R-fyv^^^

1987.

Attorney fdtj^Appellant

lliiu,^^
MICHAEL J. PETRO
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered four true and correct
copies of the foregoing Appellants' Brief to Mr. David D. Jeffs
of Jeffs and Jeffs at 90 North 100/East, P. 0. Box 683, Provo,
Utah 84603 this <P ? day of f&40^-^^-c^
t 1987.

MICHAEL J. PETRO
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

WILLIAM AVERETT and
MARIE A. AVERETT,

Ca£e Number

65070

Plaintiffs,
vs.

DECISION

UTAH COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT
NO* 1, a corporation,
Defendant.
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER AGENCY,
Intervenor.
********

In this matter the court finds the issues in favor of
the defendant and against the plaintiff on plaintiff's complaint
and the claim there alleged against Utah County Drainage District
No.

1

alleging

title

by

adverse

possession

of

the

subject

property described as "DP408" as set forth in defendant's Exhibit
No. 17.
The

property

in

question

having

been

conveyed

by

Chillian F. Packard and Phoebe S. Packard to Utah County Drainage
District
plaintiff

No. 1 by
having

that deed
succeeded

dated July
to

an

31, A.D., 1934.

interest

in

the

The

adjoining

property pursuant to deed to them on April 30, 1960, from Joseph
C. Williamson

and

Nada R. Williamson

containing

a

M

less

that

portion" clause deleting the property above referred to described
in defendant's Exhibit No. 17 from the operation of the April 30
deed from Williamson to Averett.

It having
Utah County

been

established

Drainage District

by

the evidence

Ho. 1 was created

that the

in accordance

with the laws of the State of Utah whereih it was endowed with
the powers and status of a municipal corporation, the property of
which
from

being
being

exempt

from

acquired

by

real property
adverse

taxation, and

possession,

the

protected

findings with

relation to the foregoing as set forth in the proposed findings
of

fact

of

defendant

are

hereby

adopted

and

found

to

be

consistent with the evidence, or lack thereof, presented to the
court at the trial of this matter.
The court finds the issues in f&vor of the defendant
and against
quiet

its

herein,

the plaintiff
title

and

against

the

court

on the counterclaim of defendant to
any

interest

similarly

or

claim

adopts

of

the

plaintiffs

findings

defendant's proposed findings of fact and the proposed
as

the

findings

of

the

court.

All

is

consistent

of

judgment
with

the

evidence or lack of evidence presented at the trial.
The court will not sign or enter the findings of fact,
conclusions
defendant
hereof

of

law

and

judgment

as

submitted

until after the expiration of

to

allow

plaintiff

an

by

counsel

for

10 days from the date

opportunity

to

file

whatever

objection they may have to the decision of the court.
DATED at Provo, Utah, this *1» O

day of November, 1985.

DAVID D. JEFFS
JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys at Law. P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
90 North 100 East
P. O. Box 683
Provo. Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM AVERETT and
MARIE A. AVERETT.
Plaintiffs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

V8.

UTAH COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT
NO. 1, a corporation.
Defendant.
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER AGENCY.

Civil No.

65.070

Intervenor.
/

This matter came on duly and regularly to be heard on
the 17th day of July, 1985, before the Honorable George E.
Ballif. Judge, sitting without a jury upon the Complaint of
plaintiff and the Counterclaim of defendant.

The plaintiffs

were present in Court and represented by their attorney, Allen
K. Young.

The defendant was present in Court and represented

by its attorney. David D. Jeffs.

The Court having heard the

evidence and arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in
the premises, now makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Utah County Drainage District No- 1 (herein-

after defendant) was organized on November 4, 1918 as a drainage district under Title XIX and has existed since that date.
The District as such is a municipal corporation.
2.
defendant

During

commenced

and

the

years

completed

of

1919

through

construction

of

an

1920,
open

drainage district on the subject property.
3.

On the 31st day of July, 1934, a deed from

Chillian F. and Phoebe S. Packard was executed to Utah County
Drainage District No. 1 which deed was recorded

on April 3,

1935 as Entry No. 3091, Book 316, Page 50, on the Records of
the Utah County Recorder.
4.

The above described deed conveyed to defen-

dant the property which is the subject matter of this dispute
(herein

subject

property)

and

which

is

more

particularly

described as follows:
DP 408-ALSO BEGINNING at a point 1209*
South 0°30' West and 385.44 feet North
88°30( West from the Northeast corner of
Section 31, Township 7 South, Range 3 East,
Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North
0°30' East 732 feet; thence North 88 o 30 l
West 1287 feet; thence West 0°30' East 480
feet; thence North 88 o 30 l West 66 feet;
thence South 0°30* West 515 feet; thence
South 66°30l East 660 feet; thence South
0 o 30' West 27 feet; thence South 88°20l
East 627 feet; thence South 0°30' West 627
feet; thence South 88°30' East 66 feet, to
point of beginning containina 3.32 acres
more or less.

-2-

5.

Tne aoove aescrioea aeeq turtner conveyed to

defendant a strip of land approximately 66 feet wide which ran
generally north and west of the subject property to Utah Lake.
6.
easement

There

to defendant

is no

evidence

for construction

of

the

grant

of

an

of the open drainage

ditch prior to the above described deed.

The evidence fails

to establish that defendant had acquired a prescriptive easement prior to delivery of the deed to defendant in 1934.
7.

On the 30th day of April. 1968. Joseph C.

Williamson and Naida R. Williamson conveyed a certain parcel
of

property

encompassing

Marie A. Averett.

the

subject

property

to plaintiff,

Said deed was recorded May 1, 1968 as Entry

No. 4291. Book 1109. Page 365 on the records of Utah County.
8.

The said deed from Joseph C Williamson and

Naida R. Williamson to Marie A. Averett contained the following exclusion:
LESS that portion of the above described
property
sold
to Utah County Drainage
District No. 1, a corporation by Warranty
Deed dated July 31. 1934. executed by
Chillian F. Packard and Phoebe S. Packard,
his wife, recorded April 3. 1935. as Entry
No. 3091. in Book 316. Pace 50. records of
Utah County. Utah.
9.
of

the ownership

The plaintiffs did not have actual knowledge
by defendant

of the 66 foot wide strip of

land including the subject property.
tive notice

by the recording

Plaintiffs had construc-

statute and

the deed

to their

property of the ownership by defendant of the subject property.

-3-

10.

There is no evidence that the officers and

agents of the defendant who are alive had actual knowledge of
the ownership of the subject property* although the recitation
of $100.00 consideration for the deed to the defendant in 1934
is evidence that prior officers and agents may have known of
said ownership.
11.
in

Since completion of the open drainage ditch

1920, defendant

has

owned,

used

and maintained

the open

drainage ditch on the subject property.
12.

Defendant

has not intended

has it abandoned any of the subject property.

to abandon nor
Defendant has

not sold nor has it intended to sell any of the subject property prior to the time that Intermountain Power Association
sought condemnation of the subject property.
13.
necessary

for

The entire subject property was reasonably

the

use

and

maintenance

of

defendant's

open

drainage ditch.
14.

Utah County has not levied or assessed any

real property taxes against the real property of defendant.
15.

Plaintiffs have paid all taxes which were

levied and assessed
subject

property.

against
Said

their property which adjoins the

tax assessments

included

the subject

property of the defendant.
16.
its property

Since defendant is a municipal corporation,

is exempt

from taxation.

-4-

Anv taxes

levied and

assessed against its property, wheter assessed in the name of
plaintiffs or otherwise, were unlawful.
17.
darns,

canals,

purpose of

Plaintiffs

embankments,

irrigating

have not
aqueducts

the subject

paid
or

any

amounts for

otherwise

property amounting

for

the

to the

sum of $5 per acre.
18.

Plaintiffs have not usually cultivated the

subject property.
19.

Plaintiff8 have improved

a portion of the

subject property by the construction of a sileage pit.
tiffs

have

failed

to

establish

by

a

preponderance

Plainof

the

evidence the size of such such sileage pit and the extent to
which it lies on the subject property.
20.

Plaintiffs have protected by a substantial

inclosure a portion of the subject property contained within
the corral

fence.

Plaintiffs have failed

to establish by a

preponderance of the evidence the size of such corral and the
extent to which such corral encloses the subject property.
21.

The fence on the east of the subject pro-

perty was constructed by the railroad.

The fence on the north

of the property was constructed by a Mr. Forbush.
22.

Plaintiffs did not adequately maintain the

fence on the east of the subject property nor the fence on the
north of the subject property to the extent that animals were
adequately confined or retained within the fences and as such
the fences were not a substantial inclosure.

-5-

23.
preponderance

of

Plaintiff8
the

have

evidence

failed

that

to establish

they .have protected

by a
the

subject property by a substantial inclosure.
24.

Any possession of the subject

property by

the plaintiffs was not exclusive in that other persons, including particularly the agents and employees of the defendant
made use of the subject property.
the

subject

property

by

Further, any possession of

plaintiffs was

not of

sufficiently

open, notorious, hostile and adverse nature as to bring such
possession

to

the

knowledge

of

the agents and employees of

defendant.
25.

Plaintiffs

have

failed

to establish

by a

preponderance of the evidence all of the elements necessary to
permit them to adversely possess the subject property.
26.

Defendant

assessed

plaintiffs

a

drainage

district assessment for the subject property in the amount of
$1.00 or $1.50 per year for the years 1977 to 1983.
27.

Any assessment

by defendant

is of such a

minimal nature that defendant would not be estopped thereby to
claim the subject property.
Based upon the foregoing Finding^ of Fact, the Court
now makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiffs

may

not

adversely

property of defendant held for public use,

-6-

possess

the

2.

All

of

the

subject

property

constitutes

property held for a public use by defendant,
3.

Defendant

has

not

abandoned

or

otherwise

given up any claim to the subject property.
4.

Defendant

is

not

estopped

to

assert

its

rights to the subject property.
5.

Plaintiff8

have not

established

by a pre-

ponderance of the evidence their claim to the subject property
by adverse possession.

Plaintiffs1 Complaint is dismissed, no

cause of action.
6.

Defendant

is entitled

to have the title to

the subject property quieted to it free and clear of any and
all claims of the plaintiffs by adverse possession or otherwise.

The subject property is more particularly described as

follows:
DP 408-ALSO BEGINNING at a point 1209•
South 0°30' West and 385.44 feet North
88°30< West from the Northeast corner of
Section 31. Township 7 South. Range 3 East.
Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North
0°30l East 732 feet; thence North BB°30t
West 1287 feet; thence West 0°30' East 480
feet; thence North 88 o 30 l West 66 feet;
thence South 0°30l West 515 feet; thence
South 66°30l East 660 feet; thence South
0°30' West 27 feet; thence South 88 o 20 l
East 627 feet; thence South 0°30' West 627
feet; thence South 88 o 30 l East 66 feet, to
point of beginning containing 3.32 acres
more or less.
7.

Defendant is entitled to all tunds tendered

by Intermountain Power Agency.

-7-

Dated and s i g n e d t h i s

b

day of

/^J%<A>***

J.985.

BY THE COURT:

J2UL*
George Of

Ballif. Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGS
I hereby certify that the original of the foregoing
was mailed to the Clerk of the Court. Utah County. P. O. Box
49. Provo. Utah

84603. and a copy to the below named parties

by placing same in the United States mails, postage prepaid.
this 26th day ot July. 1985. addressed as follows:
Alien K. Young. Esq.
Young. Harris & Carter
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3$o East Center
P*ovo. Utah 84601
M. Byron Fisher. Esq.
Fabian & Clendenin
Attorneys for Intermountain Power Agency
8Qo Continental Bank Buildina
S*it Lake City. Utah 84101

Secretary
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DAVID D. JEFFS
JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys at Law. P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
90 North 100 East
P. O. Box 683
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURfr OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM AVERETT and
MARIE A. AVERETT.

Plaintiffs.

JUDGMENT

vs.
UTAH COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT
NO. 1. a corporation.
Defendant.
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER AGENCY.

£ivil No.

65.070

Intervenor.

This matter came on duly and regularly to be heard on
the

17th day of July.

1985. before

the Honorable George E.

Ballif. Judge, sitting without a jury upon the Complaint of
plaintiff

and

the Counterclaim

of defendant.

The plaintiffs

were present in Court and represented by their attorney. Allen
K. Young.

The defendant was present in Court and represented

by its attorney. David D. Jeffs.

The Court having heard the

evidence and arguments of counsel, and be ing fully advised in
the premises, and having heretofore submitted its Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law. now makes and enters the following:
J U D G M E N T

1.
of

the following

Plaintiffs1 Complaint for adverse possession
described

real

property

is dismissed, no

cause of action.
2.

Defendant

is quieted

title in and to the

following described real property free and clear of any claim
of plaintiffs by adverse possession or otherwise:
DP 408-ALSO BEGINNING at a point 1209•
South 0o30( West and 385.44 feet North
88°30' West from the Northeast corner of
Section 31. Township 7 South, Range 3 East,
Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North
0o30' East 732 feet; thence North 88o30l
West 1287 feet; thence West 0°30> East 480
feet; thence North 88°30< West 66 feet;
thence South 0°30( West 515 feet; thence
South 66°30l East 660 feet; thence South
0°30' West 27 feet; thence South 88°20'
East 627 feet; thence South 0°30' West 627
feet; thence South 88°30' East 66 feet, to
point of beginning containing 3.32 acres
more or less.
3.

Defendant is awarded all funds tendered by

Intermountain Power Agency.
Dated and signed this

k

day of

^-s^rf^t^^^1985.

BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGS
I hereby certify that

the original of the foregoing

was mailed to the Clerk of the Court. Utah County. P. O. Box
49. Provo. Utah

84603. and a copy to the below named parties

by placing same in the United States mails, postage prepaid.
this 26th day of July. 1985. addressed as follows:
Allen K. Young. Esq.
Young. Harris & Carter
Attorney for Plaintiffs
350 East Center
Provo. Utah 84601
N. Byron Fisher. Esq.
Fabian & Clendenin
Attorneys for Intermountain Power Agency
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101

c*
Secretary
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
"Usually cultivated or improved/'
Property located in city's business district, consisting of unimproved vacant
lots covered with grenscwood brush and
irregularly depressed from about one to
three feet below street level, was not
"usually improved" within meaning of
subd. (1) by slight leveling of small portion of tho property which was not done to
extent that was noticeable, by dumping
of few loads of dirt thereon which did not
change its appearance or enhance its usefulness as property upon which a business
could be located, by weeding that was
done in such manner that weeds soon
flourished again, or by placing building
upon the property a few months before
institution of suit in question, preliminary
work for its placement not baring been
done for statutory period, since property
was not improved in manner usual to improve that kind and character of land
for uses to which it could be p u t Day v.
Steele, 111 U. 481, 184 P. 2d 216.
"Usually improved."
In order for land to have been "usually
improved" within meaning of subd. (1),
changes made must have been of substan-

78-12.11

tial and permanent nature and of such
type AS would bo suitable for use to
which particular type of land wns fitted,
and dinners must have been sufficient to
apprise anyone that land WAS being used
in manner in which an owner would so uso
it and not such as could be mistaken for
mere occasional trespasses. Day v. 8tcole,
111 U. 481, 184 P. 2d 216,
Collateral References.
Adverse PossessionC=>l|4 ot seq.
2 C.J.8. Adverse Possession § 88 et seq.
8 Am. Jur. 2d 188 et acq., Adverse Possession § 105 et seq.
Adverse possession: sufficiency, at regards continuity, of seasonal possession
other than for agricultural or logging pur*
poses, 24 A. L. R. 2d 632.
Grazing of livestock or gathering of natural crop as fulfilling traditional elements
of adverse possession, 48 A. L. R. 3d 818.
Reputation as to ownership or claim as
admissible on question of adverse possession, 40 A. L. R. 2d 770.
Tacking adverse possession of area not
within description of deed or contract, 17
A. L. R. 2d 1128.

78-12-10. Under claim not founded on written instrument or judgment
—Where it appears that there has been an actual continued occupation
of land under claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded
upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, the land so actually
occupied, and no other, is deemed to have been held adversely.
History: L. 1061, en, 68, § 1 ; O. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-10.

held to be exclusive. Jenkins T. Morgan.
113 U. 534,196 P. 2d 871.

Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 104-2-10 (Code 1943) which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, { 3 .

Record title.
Generally, where a person holds record
title to one traet and also occupies an adjoining area adversely, his conveyance of
the land to which he holds record title
does not thereby transfer title to land
held adversely. Home Owners' Loan Corp.
v. Dudley, 105 U. 208,141 P. 2d 160.

Croat-Reference*.
Marketable record title, 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq.
Adjoining owners.
After twenty years' occupancy of land
to fence bordering adjoining property,
owner may maintain action to prevent encroachment of sdjoining owner claiming
certain land beyond fence. Davis v. Lynham, 67 U. 283, 247 P. 294.
delusiveness of statutory methods.
Statutory methods of acquiring title
by adverse posaesHion, set out in former
lections 104-2-7 through 104-2-12, were

Collateral References.
Adverse Possession<S=>96.
2 C.J.8. Adverse Possession {227.
3 Am. Jur. 2d 183 et seq., Adverse Possession § 100 et seq.
Adverse possession by donee under parol
gift of land, 43 A. L. K. 2d 6.
Reputation as to ownership or claim as
admissible on question of adverse possesHion, 40 A. L. R. 2d 770

78-12-11. What constitutes adverse possession not under written instrument—Tsv,. *v>* nnmA.A nf constituting an adverse possession by a person
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claiming title, not founded upon a written. instrument, judgment or
decree land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following
cases only:
(1) Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
(2) Where it has been usually cultivated 0r improved.
(3) Where labor or money has been expended upon dams, canals,
embankments, aqueducts or otherwise for the purpose of irrigating such
lands amounting to the sum of $5 per acre.
One who claims title by adverse possession not founded on written instrument
must bring himself within this section.
Jenkins v. Morgan, 118 U. 684, 198 P.
2d 871.

History: L. 1961, ch. 68, § 1; 0. 1943,
ftupp., 104-18-11.
Compiler's Kotos.
Tnii section is Identical to former section 104-2-11 (Code 194S) which was repealed by Laws 1961, eh. 68, | 8.

Operation and effect of section.
The statute defining what shall constitute adverse possession is of the same
degree of efficacy as is the atatute of
fraude. Tripp v. Bagley, 74 U. 57, 276
P. 912,| 69 A. L. B. 1417.

Oroes-Referencee.
Marketable record title, 67-9-1 et eeq.
Occupying claimants, 67-6-1 et eeq.
Boundary by aoquleeoenoe.
Boundary by acquiescence is an equitable concept governed by the principles of
equity. Each ease is viewed in its own
light and the establishment of boundaries
is predicated usually, but not always, upon
a period of twenty years or more of possession. It is unrealistic to use the period
called for in the adverse possession statute.
King r. Fronk, 14 U. (2d) 188, 878 P. 2d
893.
There is no boundary by acquiescence
where owners of tract vet with buyer and
by use of a hand compass purported to
locate the boundary line. Hobson T. Panguitch Lake Corp., 680 P. 2d 792.
Construction of fence along erroneous
boundary line does not constitute acquiescence of boundary where adjacent landowner nine years later had a surrey made
to establish the true boundary. Hobson T.
Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P. 2d 792.

PrescrlptloxL
Prescriptive rights to easement of way
can arise only from use and enjoyment
of way for period of twenty years. Push
v. Anderson, 22 U. 238, 81 P. 1008.
Water right*.
Water rights may be acquired by adverse possession, that is, by continued
possession thereof for seven years. Springville % Fullmer, 7 U. 460, 27 P. 677.

S t a t u t o r y m e t h o d s of acquiring title llV
jnlvrr*e |><)MMCH«Hon, net out in former :
t ion 10-12 7 through 104 2 12. were held
to I
exeluiixe
Jenkin*> \ Morgan, 11*1

What constitutes advene possession.
It is not a compliance with rule that
possession of an adverse claimant must
be continuous, exclusive, open, hostile,
notorious, and of such a character aa to
enable owner to know of invasion of his
rights, that he let vehicles stand on unincloscd and unoccupied ground of another, led or drove horses over it, and
threw manure and rubbish on it. D. H.
Peery Estate v. Ford, 46 U. 486, 151 P. 59.
Claimant could not succeed under this
acetion even though his occupanev may
have been open, notorious, peaceable, and
under claim of right, without showing
nctualj cultivation or improvement, or
money expended for irrigation or an inc)oaur|r. Central Pac. Bv. Co. v. Tarpey,
51 r . 107, 168 P. 554, 1 A. L. R. 1319.
In view of federal atatute entitling one
to land patent who has been in poaaesaion
of anjl working mining location for limitation period provided in state statute,
one in poeaesaion for more thsn twenty
\ear*j continuously working and improving lam! for quarrying of limestone,
caiimjt lie deprived of poaaeaaion bersuse

V

l.llf^

Evidence.
In an action to quiet title, where defendant A proffered evidence that they had
conatructcd a house snd other buildings,
fhnt they had fenced the property in question, and that the houae had been occupied
na a aummer house for more than seven
yours prior to the action, the trial court
erred in not admitting the evidence of ad
wmv poM*oa«ion. Affleck v. Morgan, 12 U.
(2d) 200, 3tf4 P. 2d 6f»3.
Excluslveness of statutory methods.

fi.'W, liKi 1 \ LM 8 7 1 .
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when it was suitable only for placer mini n g where another subsequently and surreptitiously located and filed placer claim
covering land. Springer v. Southern Pac.
Co., 61 U. 690, 248 P. 819.
Defendants failed to cstabliah occupation or possession of certain land within
limits of requirements of this section,
where only evidence of possession consisted of use by defendants of that land
for gracing of their cattle, whieh use
was not exclusive inasmuch as third person used the land for same purpose to
knowledge of defendants without intervention or complaint on their part. Jenkins
v. Morgan, 113 U. 534, 196 P. 2d 871.
Repairs and improvements made by cotenants in possession to dwellings, buildings and fences were insufficient to put
other cotenants on notice that eotenanta
in possession were claiming title adversely
to them, since sueh acts were normally
consistent with tenancy in common and
not adverse to it. Sperry v. Tolley, 114
U. 303, 199 P. 2d 542.
Maintenance of a fence, payment of
taxes, and other evidence of possession
and occupation for over twenty years
were sufficient to establish ownership as
against city's claim. Gibbons v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 5 U. (2d) 219, 810 P. 2d 513.

78-12-12

8 Am. Jur. 2d $7 et aeq., Advcrae Possession { 19 et seq.
Acquisition by user or prescription of
right of way ovdr unlnclosed land, 48 A. L.
R. 2d 1140.
1
Adverse possession baaed on encroachment of building or other structure, 2 A.
L. R. 3d 1005. r
Adverse possession involving ignorance
or mistake as! to boundaries—modern
views, 80 A. L. R. 2d 1171.
Adverse possession of common, 9 A. L. R.
1373.
Adverse possession of railroad right of
way, 50 A. L. R. 303.
Cutting of timber as adverse possession,
170 A. L. R. 887
Orasing of livestock or gathering of natural crop as fulfilling traditioaal elements
of adverse posseaaion, 48 A. L. R. 3d 818.
Possession by widow after extinguishment of dower 4B adverse to heirs or their
privies, 75 A. l i R. 147.
Reputation as to ownership or claim as
admissible on question of adverse possession, 40 A. L. R. 2d 770.
Use by public as affecting acquisition by
individual of right of way by prescription,
111 A. L. R. 2 f l .
Use of property by public as affecting
acquisition of title by adverse posseaaion,
58 A. L. R. 3d 1182.

Collateral References.
Adverse Poeses*ion*»19-21.
2 CJ.8. Adverse Posseaaion ( 8 0 et seq.

78-12-12. Possession moat be continuous, and taxes p a i d - i n no caae
•hall adverse posseaaion be conaidered established under the provisions of
any aection of thia code, unless it shall be shown that the land haa been
occupied and claimed for the period of aeven years continuously, and that
the party, his predecessors and grantors have pai<| all taxes which have
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law.
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, § 1; O. 1943,
, - - 104-12-12.
iAiiA<n
Supp.,
Compiler's Notes.
This section is identical to former section 1042-12 (Code 1948) which wsa repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3 . 8ection
104-2-12 wss amended by Laws 1951, ch.
*9> § l ; that provision is compiled as 7812-12.1 herein. The 8upreme Court held
the amendment was valid despite the repeal of section 104-2-12.
Cross-Reference*.
Marketable record title, 57 9 1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, 57-6-1 et seq.
Tax sales, 59-10-29 et seq.
Acquisition of title in general.
Where claimaut under claim of owner-

ship went into Actual possession of certain
j 0 t t which had been sold to county for
unpaid taxes, and immediately thereafter
fenced lota and commenced to Improve
them, subsequently receiving deed from
county, held possession was adverse, from
time of entry, as to all the world except
county. Welnerl v. 8tearns, 40 U. 185, 120
P. 490, Ann. Ca^. 1914C, 1175.
Open, notorious and hostile use and possession of the property and payment of
taxes thereon, all under claim of right,
will constitute advene possession. Mansfield v. Neff, 43 U. 258, 134 P. 1160.
Where defendant and his predecessors
hud been in actual, open, nnd adverse
possession of land for statutory period,
and for seven [successive years hnd paid
taxes thcteon, I and they were inclosed,
occupied, and icultivated, title was ac-
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tural or logging purposes, 24 A. L. B. 2d
632.
Use of property by public aa affecting
acquisition of title by advene poeeeeaionf
56 A. L. B. 8d 1182.

Law Revlewi.
Note, Boundaries by Agreement and
Acquiescence in Utah, 1976 Utah L. Bev*
221.

78-1242.1. PoMeition and payment of taxes — proviso — Tax wu«. —
In no case shall adverse possession be established under the provisions of
this code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and
claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and that the party, his
predecessors and grantors have paid all the taxes which have been levied
and assessed upon such land according to law. Provided, however, that
payment by the holder of a tax title to real property or his predecessors, of
all the taxes levied and assessed upon such real property after the delinquent tax sale or transfer under which he claims for a period of not lest
than four years and for not less than one year after the effective date1
of this amendment, shall be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this
section in regard to the payment of taxes necessary to establish advene
possession.
History: R. g. 1896 4 O. L. 1907, § 2866;
O. L. 1917, {6466; &. 8. 1933 * O. 1943,
104-2-12; L. 1961, eh. 19,11.
OompUer'e Notee.
This section reflecta the amendment by
Laws 1951, eh. 19, J 1 to section 104-212
(Code 1943). Although aection 104-212
waa repealed by Laws 1961, eh. 68,18, the
Supreme Court held that ehapter 19 waa
not repealed. (See Hanaen v. Morria annotated under 78-12-5.1, aupra.) Section
1 of ch. 58 enacted the successor to 1042-12, now compiled aa 78-12-12.
Repealing Olauae.
Soction 2 of Laws 1951, ch. 19 provided:
"8ec. 104-2-5.10 aa amended by chapter 19,
Laws of Utah 1943 aa amended by chapter
8, Laws of Utah 1947, ia hereby repealed."
Oroae-Referencee.
Marketable record title, 57-9-1 et aeq.
Occupying claimants, 67-6-1 et seq.
Tax sales, 59-10-29 et seq.
Payment of taxea.
Payment of taxes is a necessary require-

ment in order to establish adverae potaeaaion by a tax title claimant, and re*
demption from taxes cannot be considered
aa payment of taxes, Lyman v. National
Mtg. Bond Corp., 7 U. (2d) 123, 220 P.
2d 822.
Judgment waa properly entered for defendanta in a declaratory judgment action
to determine righte of partiea to realty
poaaeaaed by defendanta under tax deed
where plaintiifi had not been in poaaeaaioa
of the realty for more than twelve years
prior to the bringing of the action and had
not paid any taxea thereon since 1932 and
defendanta held possession under an apparent claim of right adversely to plaintiffs for more than seven years by grating
sheep thereon, the validity of the tax deed
being immaterial. Cope v. Bountiful Livestock Co., 13 tJ. (2d) 20, 368 P. 2d 68.
Collateral References.
Adverse Posaession£=»79(4); Taxation^*
805(4).
I
2 C.J.8. Adverse Possession § 138; 85
C.J.8. Taxation §§ 984, 985.
3 Am. Jur. 2d 209 et seq., Adverae
Possession § 124 ct scq.

78-12-13. Adverse possession of public itreets or ways.—No person
shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands held by
any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, designated
for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares,
or for any other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any
length of time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such
town or city or county or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or
otherwise disposed of, and conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for
200
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a valuable consideration, and that for more than seven years subsequent
to such conveyance the purchaser, his grantees or succeasors in interest,
have been in the exclusive, continuous and adverse possession of such real
estate; in which case an adverse title may be acquired.
Hlatory: L. 1951, ch. 58, | 1 ; 0 . 1943,
Sapp n 104-12-13.
Compiler's Notes.
Thia section ia identical to former eection 104-2-13 (Code 1043) which waa repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, { 8.
Cross-References.
Diipoaal of unuaed righta of way, 2712-07.
Highwaya continue until abandoned, 2712-00.
Vacation of highways, 87-12-102 et seq.
Establishment of a holding b y city.
The city muat have tome semblance of
title, poaaeaaion or right to use, and making a aurvey, destruction of a fence between the atreet and adjoining property,
and verbal aaaertion of ownership by the
city are not sufficient to establish a holding. Oibbona v. 8alt Lake City Corp., 6
U. (2d) 219, 310 P. 2d 513.
Estoppel
There ia no bar of the statute of limits-

tiona again it a city, in reapect to a public
atreet within its boundaries; the city may,
however, be estopped by ita affirmative
acts to claim laud aa part of a atreet.
Wall v. 8alt Lake Citt, 60 U. 603, 168 P.
766.
I
Where city quitclaimed alley to private
party in contravention of statute, for
small consideration, and there waa no
evidence that property ever waa aaaeaaed
againat grantee or his successors in interest, and time element was abort and there
was no replatting or change in whole
neighborhood to benefit of all adjacent
landowners, there was no ground for estoppel in paia aa against city's right to
qniet title aa againat parties holding under grantee of quitclaim deed. Tooele
City v. Elkington, 10b U. 486, 116 P. 2d
406.
Collateral References.
Adverse Poase*sion$=»8(l), (2).
2 C J . 8 . Adverse Possession { 1 4 .
3 Am. J u r . 2d 300, Adverse Possession
§206.

78-12-14. Possession of tenant deemed possession of landlord.—When
the relation of landlord and tenant has existed between any persons, the
possession of the tenant ia deemed the possession of the landlord until
the expiration of seven years from the termination of the tenancy, or,
where there has been no written lease, until the expiration of seven years
from the time of the last payment of rent, notwithstanding that such
tenant may have acquired another title, or may have claimed to hold
adversely to his landlord; but such presumption cannot be made after the
periods herein limited.
Hlatory: X*. 1061, ch. 68, § 1 ; C. 1943,
Bupp., 104-12-14.

an agent. Hyndman v. 8towe. 0 II. 23, 83
P . 227.

Compiler's Notes.
This aoction ia identical to former section 104-214 (Code 1943) which waa
repealed by Lawa 1951, ch. 68, { 3.

Scope and operation of section.
This section does not seem to be limited
to parties actually residing within thia
state, nor does it establish a rule that
whore a party settles on the public domain, incloses a parcel of land for a farm,
and makes valuable improvements thereon, with the bona fide intention of purchasing the same whenever a title could
be procured from the government, he must
be constantly present on such land. Actual
occupancy may be evidenced by an incloaure, and maintained by an agent or
tenant. Hyndman v[ Stowe, 9 U. 23, 33
P. 227.

Cross-He ferences.
Landlord and tenant may be joined aa
parties, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
20(a).
Tenant does not hold under color of title
against landlord, 67-6-4.
Nonresidents.
Under this section a nonresident guardian may maintain a possessory right for his
ward, who is also a nonresident, through
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